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Geographic masses, the stuff we deal with that cannot be categorized as geographic objects, comprise
a crucial but largely unrecognized component of the core ontology of geographic information.
Although masses have been rarely acknowledged in GIScience, they appear in geographic discourse
just as often as objects. A concise but consistent formal definition of a geographic mass particular,
which distinguishes a mass from an object, can be applied to any endurant phenomena, enabling a
richer understanding of the geographic milieu, and more informed decision making during modeling
and analysis processes.
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1 Introduction
There appears to be a hole in the core ontology of Geographic Information Science. What has
become the conventional wisdom in our understanding of the world and how to represent it,
including objects and fields, space and time, processes and attributes, is missing a substantial
class of phenomena.
In my introductory GIS courses, when I present the classic core principle of the object
and field views of the world, I am sometimes asked, “what about stuff like water, petroleum,
vegetation, suburbia, and so on? Are they objects or fields?” My typical answer, “neither,”
is not very satisfying to the average college student. What should we do with these? Do
they matter?
In other fields, such as philosophy and linguistics, these phenomena are most often called
masses, [29] and they have been extensively (if incompletely) studied. The purpose of this
paper is not to reinvent the concept, but to answer the question, “are masses relevant to
geographic inquiry and geographic information science?” If so, I will further develop an
understanding of masses in a geographic context, and how they can be incorporated into the
core ontology of geographic information.
Over the years, the GIScience community has flirted with mass phenomena. Couclelis
comes close in mentioning “extensive entities” that do not fit into the classic object model, [5]
and Peuquet acknowledges the difference between “continuous properties” (fields) and
“continuous matter” (masses) without saying much about the latter [22]. Galton acknowledges
the existence of masses as an aside, without incorporating them into his geo-ontology [6]:
later, outside the GIScience realm, Galton does incorporate “material” (masses) into an
ontological framework, but does not fully develop a theory thereof [7].
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14:2 Geographic Masses
Smith and Mark mention “stuffs,” but they express doubt that stuffs are relevant to
geographic phenomena before they start their study, and they rarely appear in the resultant
lists of typical geographic phenomenon [28]. However, this is at least partially due to the
fact that the phrasing of their questionnaire is object-centric.1
2 What is a Mass?
The most common way the literature distinguishes phenomena as objects and masses is to
simply say, “objects are things and masses are stuff,” [4, 29] or to resort to examples: a
building is an object, while the metal, wood, and concrete that comprise it are masses. The
Oxford English Dictionary contains a number of definitions of mass, including some with
closely related senses:
A dense aggregation of objects having the appearance of a single, continuous body.
A coherent body of matter of unspecified or indeterminate shape, and usually of relatively
large bulk; a solid and distinct object occupying space.
A large amount, number, or quantity of a thing or things, material or immaterial [1].
These and other definitions contain two basic characteristics of masses that differentiate
them from prototypical objects: 1) they are amorphous, without regard for a defined shape
or boundary; 2) they appear to be continuous, without regard for discrete parts [18].
This may seem precise, but definitions like the above have proven to be too vague to
apply to many real phenomena, and contain two apparent contradictions that have vexed
scholars for decades: 1) in the first definition, how can it simultaneously contain objects but
appear continuous? and 2) how can a body/amount/quantity not have a shape or boundary?
To develop the concept of a mass in geographic inquiry, these and other issues will need to
be resolved.
A formal definition of a mass, if it can resolve these issues, should be more operational
than these vague definitions. That is, it should help us more clearly distinguish objects and
masses in edge cases, and know what we should subsequently do with them. While several
formal general ontologies have been developed that include masses as a category [8, 27, 21, 13],
I have yet to find one that fully formalizes the definition of a mass. So, I will try.
3 Ontological Framework
This work must fit within a general metaphysical and ontological framework. Given that
multiple contradicting philosophies have been proposed and debated for hundreds of years,
and none has emerged victorious, and because I have no interest in inventing yet another
one, I will simply select the existing frameworks that make the most sense to me.
Firstly, and least controversially, we must distinguish between universals (kinds of phe-
nomena) and particulars (individual phenomena); particulars may be thought of as instances
of universals. Geospatial technology focuses on representing particulars, and that will be the
primary focus here, but let us start by declaring a universal as follows:
1 Their study gave each respondent one of five prompts to list geographic phenomena that came to
mind. However, all five prompts were based on count nouns: “a feature,” “an object,” “a concept,”
or “something.” They also note that fields appeared in the results even less often than stuffs. This is
probably not intentional bias on the authors’ part, because the prompts seem rather generic unless one
were specifically looking for fields and masses. At best, the results of this study show that fields and
masses are not so dominant in common-sense geography that participants woud think of them despite
the wording of the prompts.
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X (upper-case letter): A universal type of phenomenon. This could be as simple as a
common noun, like “sheep” or “mountain;” but I relax the common definition to also
include more specific concepts or forms of reference, like “those mountains” or “three
sheep.” In the latter case, note that X is not three actual sheep, just the notion of a
group of three sheep.
Particular phenomena are more of a challenge, as there is some debate on the nature of
their existence [25]. Poli, building on earlier theories, distinguishes three “strata of reality,”
with regards to a phenomenon being studied [23]: the material (the world as it actually
exists independently of humanity), the mental-psychological (how an individual human
conceptualizes the world), and the social (how people collectively organize the world through
mechanisms such as language, institutions, or maps). Ontologists have tended to divide into
camps according to which of these three strata they believe to be fundamental (“really real”),
with the others seen as derivative, unstructured, or nonexistent: realists favor the material
stratum, conceptualists the mental-psychological, and nominalists the social. We might call
this tendency stratum exclusivity.
Furthermore, the scholarly dialogue concerning masses has followed three tracks that
roughly correspond to Poli’s strata: physics or metaphysics, cognition, and linguistics or
semantics. By far, the latter approach has been the most common, probably because language
structures are easier to access and study than mental ideas and physical reality. Frequently,
studies have mixed the approaches, assuming a strong correspondence between physical
masses, mass concepts, and mass terms, and using that assumption to make an argument or
conclusion about one of the levels based on a characteristic of another level. We might call
this stratum conflation. Laycock and Bunt both lament this tendency, and caution scholars
to focus on one or the other [17, p.12] [2, p.49]. That is, evidence from any of the three
realms may be suggestive of the nature of phenomena in another realm, but not proof.
I will attempt to be metaphysically neutral in keeping with Gracia, who acknowledges
that all three strata, and all three lines of inquiry, can have equal validity, depending on
the situation [11, p.199-205]. Such a neutral or hybrid stance is reminiscent of Lakoff’s
experiential realism, in which knowledge is equally influenced by reality, personal experience,
and social experience [16]; as well as the post-positivist approach to scientific epistemology.
It is also suggested in Herre’s fourth phenomenal stratum of reality, consisting of phenomena
that may or may not be “real” in the material-stratum sense, but are at the very least heavily
motivated by real-world conditions; they may also be concepts, but are standardized by
society and language to such a degree that we all recognize the same phenomenon, so they
are indistinguishable from real [14, p.7]. For example, it may not be important whether a
tree really exists as a distinct object, or as a conceptualization of sensory perceptions of an
inherently unorganized reality, or as a term created by society to categorize an uncategorized
reality, as long as I can point at something and we all agree that it is a tree. This all sounds
like a lot of the phenomena we represent in GIS.
We can mediate the above strata and lines of inquiry by making a formal distinction
between them:
a (lower-case letter): A particular geographic phenomenon in the material stratum. Phe-
nomenon is defined very broadly to include anything that might be a subject of interest,
with no restriction on its existence, nature, complexity, or spatiotemporal extent. Geo-
graphic limits the view to phenomena that occur or exist somewhere on Earth, at a
medium to small scale (i.e., it could be shown on a map).
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a : X a categorized phenomenon, in which it is assigned to a universal through mental
and/or social processes.2 This can be read as “a–as–X.” This is only a claim, which may
or may not be valid, hence the following:
Xa categorizability as a predicate: “a is (a/an) X,” or more precisely, “a can be considered
(a/an) X.” This is a predicate, not a set theoretic membership (a ∈ X), because there is
no requirement that X have an extension (a set of individuals).
Representing both the real-world phenemonon, and our conceptualization(s) thereof, as
separate but equal entities, may be able to resolve much of the ontological debate described
above. One could say that a realist believes in an extremely strong correspondence between
a and a : X, the latter being a simple derivative of the former. Conversely, the nominalist
could be said to believe in a very weak correspondence, such that a is not attainable from a
study of a : X, and subsequently focuses solely on the latter. In fact, there is a continuum of
correspondence: there are likely phenomena that can only be considered a single way, while
others can be categorized in a number of different ways, and there are some in which the
concept is only loosely based on real-world conditions.3
In terms of spatio-temporal ontology, objects and masses are both endurants (hereafter
End(a : X)), as opposed to occurrents (processes and events). An endurant is informally
defined in most top-level ontologies [8, 27, 21]4 as a phenomenon that endures through time;
it is recognizable as a complete entity at any time during its existence. For example, at any
moment, a tree is still recognizable as a tree; over time, it may change, but it is the same
tree.
Although I am not doing a full formalization of temporal nature, we do need some
definitions that place endurants in space and time, based on Simons (but with my own
symbols) [26, p.132]:
S(a) the footprint of a, the minimal region of space in which it exists.
t any period of time, including intervals and moments of zero duration.
T (a) The lifespan of a phenomenon, the period of time during which a exists.
Fta A temporal predicate, a claim that something about a is true throughout t [26, p.130].
at A temporal restriction, a as it exists at t, whether all of a, part of it, or none of it. This
is formally defined by:
D1 ∀t(Ftat ⇐⇒ Fta)
Anything that is true of a during t is also true of at, and vice versa, including such
predicates as part-whole relationships, attributes, and even existence. This does not
require that t be part of T (a); for any times outside its lifespan, at is empty.
3.1 Objects vs. Masses
The continuous and amorphous nature of a mass is manifested mereologically as homogeneous
reference, perhaps first and best explained by Quine based on concepts from Goodman:
2 I am not distinguishing here between the mental and social strata, or between concepts and words. I am
definitely not asserting that they are indistinguishable, and a distinction may be useful in the future,
but for the formal definitions presented in this paper, the difference did not turn out to be important.
3 this acknowledgement provides a way to circumvent the oft-debated coincidence problem, the seeming
paradox in which a single body of matter can be both “some gold” and “a ring” at the same time [12],
which frequently arises in discussions of masses. The problem is solved by acknowledging that a single
real phenomenon can be simultaneously categorized in two ways without having to be two phenomena.
4 I have yet to find a formal definition of endurant or occurrent that isn’t fraught with issues. Some have
even argued that this demonstrates that the distinction doesn’t exist [25]. I have developed a solution
based on the a/a : X distinction, but it is beyond the scope of this paper.
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masses are cumulative or collective (the combination of two amounts of “some water” is
still “some water”) and generally divisive or dissective (half of “some water” is still “some
water”) [24, p.91,99] [10, p.38]. Objects are neither: half of “a car” is not “a car” but scrap
metal, and “a car” and another car combined is not “a car” but “cars.” Note that the concept
of homogeneous reference is not evaluated over time, but at a moment: Over time, a rock
(object) can be broken into multiple rocks, but then it is no longer a rock; at a single instant,
a rock is not composed of multiple rock objects.
Spatial cumulativity and spatial divisiveness5 can be formalized in mereology6 as follows:
D2 CumS(a : X) := ∀b[ (T (a) ◦ T (b) ∧ ∀t(t≤T (a) ∧ t≤T (b) =⇒ S(at) 6=S(bt)) ∧ Xb ∧
∃c(c = a + b)) =⇒ Xc ]
A categorized phenomenon is spatially cumulative iff for any other phenomenon with
the same label, which exists at least in part during the same time, and is never spatially
coincident, and such that the two phenomena have a meaningful mereological sum, then
the sum is also of the same category. For example, if a is some sand categorized as “a
volume of sand,” and b is any different volume of sand that existed at the same time as
a, such that it makes sense to consider their combination as a phenomenon, than that
combination can also be categorized as a volume of sand. Conversely, a “country” fails
this test because for any other distinct but contemporary country, it may be meaningful
to collect them as a single phenomenon (i.e., the mereological sum exists), but that
phenomenon is “two countries,” a different universal.
D3 DivS(a : X) := ∃b, c, t(t≤ T (a) ∧ t≤ T (b) ∧ t≤ T (c) ∧ ¬(S(bt) ◦ S(ct)) ∧ a =
b + c ∧ Xb ∧ Xc)
A categorized phenomenon is spatially divisive iff at some time during its existence, it
can be divided into two spatially disjoint parts that are each of the same category as the
whole. For example, a typical volume of sand a can easily be divided into two volumes
of sand b and c.7 However, a country (as a sovereign state) cannot be composed of two
countries.8
A mass can thus be defined as an endurant (End(a : X)) that is spatially amorphous,
while an object is the opposite:
D4 Mass(a : X) := End(a : X) ∧ CumS(a : X) ∧DivS(a : X)
A mass is any endurant that is spatially cumulative and divisive.
D5 Object(a : X) := End(a : X) ∧ ¬(CumS(a : X) ∧DivS(a : X))
An object has one or neither of these characteristics. It is possible for a phenomenon
to be cumulative but not divisive, such as two “horses.” The opposite is common with
5 Most existing definitions of masses do not distinguish homogeneous reference in space and time, but I
have found this distinction to be crucial, because spatial parts and temporal parts have very different
implications. Treatments of masses in space and time, such as Galton and Mizoguchi [7], would be
more clear with this recognition. Spatial homogeneity distinguishes masses from objects, while temporal
homogeneity (not discussed here) distinguishes occurrents into processes and events.
6 In formal mereology, there sometimes seems to be as many notation systems and axiomatic systems as
there are mereologists. I am using extensional mereology, CEM in the classification of mereological
systems by Casati and Varzi [3], and the following notation: ≤ for part (proper part or equal), ◦ for
overlap (having shared parts), + for mereological sum. Note that mereology is employed only on the
material-stratum phenomena, space and time, not on the categorized phenomena; this circumvents
many of the issues with CEM pointed out by Simons and others [26].
7 Yes, there is some very small volume of sand that can only be divided into two collections of a couple
grains of sand, not a mass. More on this later.
8 The United Kingdom is no exception; England is called a country, but it is still a different kind of entity
from the UK as a whole.
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Figure 1 What is this? See Table 1.
linear and layer phenomena: a river can be cut into two parts, each called a river, but it
is possible to find another river that combine to form “rivers.”9 In both these cases, it
makes sense to classify them as objects.
How is this definition of objects and masses based on homogeneous reference equivalent
to the earlier definition based on continuity and boundedness? The necessary boundary
of an object clearly separates it from any neighboring object. Thus, when we consider
them together, the intervening boundary makes us see them as two objects rather than
one. Conversely, the boundary of a mass instance (say, a patch of water in the midst of the
ocean) is at best arbitrary and inconsequential; so when two adjoining masses are considered
together, their boundaries can be easily ignored (if they were ever recognizable to begin with)
and the two considered as a single entity. Furthermore, the fact that a mass is divisive, able
to be divided a number of ways without ontological change, suggests that the boundaries of
each division are arbitrary and inconsequential.
The above definitions only apply to a single particular phenomenon categorized in one
way. Each of the definitions could be extended to an entire universal category, iff every
phenomenon that uses that category is classified the same way:
D4c Mass(X) := ∀a(Xa =⇒ Mass(a : X))
D5c Object(X) := ∀a(Xa =⇒ Object(a : X))
Likewise, they could be extended to a particular phenomenon in general, if every possible
way of categorizing the phenomenon falls into the same ontological class:
D4p Mass(a) := ∀X(Xa =⇒ Mass(a : X))
D5p Object(a) := ∀X(Xa =⇒ Object(a : X))
The formal definitions can now be used to categorize actual phenomena. For example,
the phenomena at the center of Figure 1 can be categorized in a number of ways, as shown
in Table 1.
This example demonstrates the applicability of the formal definitions, but should not
be taken as an inference of general patterns. For example, the last column is blank only
9 This occurs because linear and layer objects are crucially bounded in one dimension, but not in the
other(s).
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Table 1 Categorizations of the phenomena shown in Figure 1.
X CumS DivS a : X X a
A mountain no no object object –
Limestone yes yes mass – –
A geologic formation no yes object object –
The mountains yes yes mass – –
Mountainous landscape yes yes mass – –
A mountain range no no object object –
Terrain yes yes mass – –
Elevation yes yes mass – –
because I specifically chose a situation that could be classified many ways; there may be
many phenomena that can only be classified one way. That said, it does show that categories
and particulars may not be able to be universally classified as either mass or object. This
demonstrates the real power of the formal distinction between a and a : X; previous attempts
to define masses formally have generally either tried to define Mass(X) without reference to a
(i.e., a nominalist approach), or to define Mass(a) without a : X (i.e., a realist approach), or
just conflate them, all of which have frequent exceptions, which have only served to strength
opposition to the existence of masses.
4 Against Masses
Opinions are mixed on the existence of mass particulars [29]. Every few years since the 1960s,
authors from various disciplines have proselytized the existence of masses, whereupon others
have quickly responded to refute them. Each phase of the debate seems to repeat many of
the same points, which I summarize here.
Arguments against the existence of mass particulars often involve two closely related
assertions: 1) mass nouns (water, wood, metal) are strictly universals [30], because 2) any
instance thereof (e.g., “the water in this lake”) must have a boundary, and is therefore an
object by definition. Perhaps the best refutation of these dates back to Chappell [4]. He
accepts that instances of masses are different from their universals; he refers to the former as
“parcels of stuff,” using the most generic container term he could muster. However, he refutes
the first argument by demonstrating that these parcels are still significantly different from
object particulars (his “substances”) in the same way that mass universals are different from
object universals (i.e., having homogeneous reference), and should thus still be considered a
separate kind of phenomenon.10 The formal definition of a mass given above works just fine
for these parceled particulars: if a is a parcel of water, and b is another parcel of water, then
if a⊕ b makes sense, it is a parcel of water.
10Laycock rejects Chappell’s explanation on the grounds that requiring us to talk about plurals and masses
in singular terms violates their inherent non-singularity [17]. In fact, Laycock doubts that mereology, set
theory, or the entire predicate calculus can even apply to plurals and masses for this reason. However,
he does not develop an alternative formalism, and those alternatives that have been published tend to
have their own semantic and ontological problems; they may hold promise, though [19, 20]. Laycock’s
argument is compelling, but I believe Chappell’s approach is still useful as long as the parcels are
recognized as only temporary samples of the phenomenon, not the phenomenon of study (a solution
mentioned in passing by Laycock). Simons follows a similar approach to fitting the predicate calculus
and mereology to masses and plurals [26, pp.151–162].
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On the second point, Chappell concedes that these parcels must have boundaries and
a form, even if they are vague. However, he points out that they are “indifferent to form,”
that is, the boundaries and shape of a mass particular are not relevant to its identity and
characteristics as a mass; as Jackendoff puts it, “one can think of the boundaries as outside
the current field of view.” [15, p.19] Furthermore, example mass particulars often used to
argue against their specialness, such as the gold that constitutes a ring or the water contained
in a cup, are clearly bounded and object-like, but they are straw man examples; it is just
as easy to find masses that are practically impossible to bound and objectify, like the salt
dissolved in the ocean or the moisture in soil.
It is not just that the boundary is vague; objects can also have indeterminate boundaries,
but if so, their vaguely defined form is still crucial to their definition. For example, a mountain
is usually vaguely bounded on the sides and bottom, but the form of its boundary (especially
the profile shape of its upper surface) is absolutely crucial to its being a mountain. On the
other hand, the rock that makes up the same mountain can be recognized, described and
analyzed at length without ever referring to its boundary or shape.
Another issue that has been raised is that the common definitions of a mass, including the
formal definition above, test positive for some phenomena that do not seem like prototypical
masses. These include:
Immaterial but not abstract phenomena (i.e., occurring at a location but having no mass),
such as magnetism and field properties like temperature or population density.
Phenomena that use mass terms, but are visibly discontinuous, such as vegetation or
infrastructure.
Uncounted plurals, such as “some people.”
Each of these types of phenomena meet the formal definition of mass; do they meet the
original intended definition, or is this a sign that the formalism is not faithful to the intent?
All of them meet the requirement of being amorphous, because their boundaries are not
relevant to their meaning.
Magnetism is continuous, and thus meets both of the requirements. As to its immateriality,
note that none of the definitions require that a mass actually has mass: that is just an
unfortunate coincidence of terminology, but every other term that has been proposed for this
ontic category, such as substance or material, has the same problem. Immaterial continuous
phenomena and field properties behave like masses, so I propose they should be considered a
kind of mass.
The problem in the other two cases listed above is that they are not “really” continuous,
but are composed of clearly visible individuals, unlike prototypical masses, such as water
and metal; these are often called collective nouns. However, this distinction isn’t as clear
as it seems; it is just a matter of scale. Even most masses that appear continuous, such as
water, are composed of objects at a sub-visible scale and are thus not infinitely divisive; this
lower-limit mass decomposition is often called Quine’s minimal parts hypothesis [24, p.99].
To talk about this scale effect, let use define the support of a phenomenon category as the
smallest size that it can be and still be recognizable as that category; for a mass, it would be
the approximate diameter of a collection of “several” constituent individuals that could be
amassed.
It turns out that for almost any size support, one can come up with an example mass
that is aggregated at that scale, as shown in Table 2. Where should we draw the line
between a “true” mass and a collective? Yes, this argument rings of one of those classic
Greek continuum paradoxes, but the point is that wherever we chose to draw the line would
arbitrarily divide very similar phenomena. I have grouped them into four classes based on the
relative perceptibility of the mass and its constituents, but even these have vague boundaries
that depend on the particular phenomenon.
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Table 2 Continuum of scales at which objects are aggregated into masses.
Mass Constituent Support





air mix of molecules 10−6m
clay grain 10−5m
silt grain 10−4m MINI-MASS
sand grain 10−2.5m
object visible,




brick brick 10−0.5m MESO-MASS
lumber board 100m object and mass
equalbrush plant 100.5m






the desert plant, rock, etc. 102.5m
the country farm, house, road 103m
the mountains mountain, valley 104m
Instead of trying to make the distinction at all, it seems more straightforward to just
acknowledge that when we categorize these phenomena as masses, we are (temporarily)
ignoring the individuals. As Bunt puts it, masses are treated “as if they did not consist of
discrete parts,” regardless of whether discrete parts physically exist or can be perceived [2,
p.45]. This is much easier with the mini-masses than with the macro-masses, but it is the
same cognitive leap. In fact, macro-masses have occasionally been acknowledged elsewhere.
DOLCE, one of the general ontologies that have been published, has a category for “visual
landscape,” which includes phenomena such as The City, The Mountains, or The Desert,
which are clearly macro-scale, and makes it a subcategory of “Amount of Matter” (its term
for mass) [8].
Plurals are a little different in this regard; they acknowledge the existence of their
constituent individuals, but they are still considered as less important than the collective
mass.11 Some are more mass-like than others, especially pluralia tantum, terms that occur
only in plural form and cannot be counted [9, p.612], such as woods, outskirts, and suburbs.
It occasionally works the other way too: some mass terms (in English) reflect universals
that behave more like class aggregates than mass aggregates; they are a shortcut for talking
about a variety of similar objects, but still recognizing them as distinct objects. The classic
example is “furniture.” It is entirely valid to refer to a single chair as “this furniture,” which
identifies it with a class, not a mass. A geographic-scale example would be a GIS layer called
“infrastructure,” which would likely consist of individual objects, not a single blob.
This intentional ignorance of boundaries and constituent individuals may seem offensive,
especially if one is only concerned with things “as they really are,” but it is not a problem
11The similarity, if not equivalence, of plurals and masses, is covered at length by Laycock and others [17].
Some, like Nicolas, have even attempted to combine them the other way by making masses look like
plurals, but his model is a linguistic abstraction that makes little sense ontologically [19].
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for our conceptual framework; it is just an example of a slightly weaker correspondence
between a particular a and a choice of a : X. In fact, this framework minimizes the effect of
Quine’s minimal parts hypothesis by not expecting universal homogeneity. Considering a
huge amount of water as a mass does not depend on what we would do with an unrelated
microscopic collection of a few water molecules. Bunt recognizes this for linguistic analysis
at least: “nothing in the use of a mass noun indicates a commitment ... to the existence of
minimal parts.” [2, p.45]. Essentially, the minimal parts hypothesis is an example of stratum
conflation, imposing a material-realm expectation on a conceptual/social-realm entity.
One argument against assuming a strong correspondence is the fact that the mass/count
term distinction varies from one language to another; some languages have more mass terms,
some have less; very few have as many cases as English in which both are available to describe
the same phenomenon (e.g., wildlife/animals). At the extreme, the Asian classifier languages,
such as Indonesian and Cantonese, deal with almost all nouns in a very mass-like grammar,
but this does not mean that they conceptualize everything as mass or that more masses exist
in China than in England.
Another issue with assuming a direct correspondence between linguistic syntax and
cognitive structure is that while languages evolve to express ideas, they are eventually
standardized and regulated to a high degree. In English, some words are count and some
are mass because that’s what the OED says they are. In fact, I wonder if more could be
learned about the linguistic/cognitive correspondence by studying bad grammar than by
studying grammatical rules. For example, common mistakes by non-native speakers, and
the perennial issue that students have with “data is/are,” probably say more about their
cognitive structures than their level of intelligence.
5 Do Masses Matter in Geography?
For whatever reason, masses have been occasionally mentioned in GIScience ontologies, but
have never found their way into the common conceptual framework thereof. It is fair to ask,
“Is that even an issue?” Perhaps they exist, but just do not matter enough to consider.
To investigate this, I took a look at what the field finds important, by surveying the subjects
discussed in a spectrum of journals: the International Journal of Geographic Information
Science (for a GIScience focus), the Annals of the AAG (for a broader geography perspective),
International Journal of Remote Sensing (more of a remote sensing, physical geography, and
raster focus) and ArcUser (for a GIS practitioner perspective).12 In all, 91 articles were
reviewed. The subject matter of each article was classified as either predominantly physical
geography, human geography, or environmental geography (a mix of human and physical).
In each article, I recorded any endurant particular that was significantly discussed or
studied. As best I could, I avoided occurents (especially processes) and universals (which
typically meant skipping over the literature review and theoretical sections, and I generally
skipped review articles), although one could probably debate the inclusion of a few of the
items in my list. I documented 750 references to endurants (not unique; things like counties
and cities were listed in many articles), an average of about 8 per article.
These were classified as either object or mass using the formal definitions above. Within
the masses, I identified each as a field if it was clearly a property. Plural terms required
12 Specifically, the issues mined were IJGIS V.22 #10, V.33 #1, V.33 #2 (21 total articles); Annals V.106
#1 January 2016, V.108 #3 March 2018 (28 total articles); IJRS V.40 #1 (20 articles); ArcUser V.19
#4 Fall 2016, V.21 #3 Summer 2018, #4 Fall 2018 (23 total articles). The sample was neither random
nor strategic; these issues were at hand.
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further consideration. They tended to fall into three conceptual groups, as evidenced by the
narrative context: 1) the set of individuals was conceptualized as a single whole (e.g., “the
group of people who were at the event”), in which case it was tagged as a single object; 2)
the focus was on the individuals (e.g., “each of the 245 animals we saw...”), in which case
they were tagged as objects; or 3) an uncounted plural that behaved as a mass concept (e.g.,
“farms lined the highway”), which was tagged as a type of mass. One test of the last type
was whether the plural could be replaced by a synonymous mass term without changing the
meaning (e.g., “farmland lined the highway”).
This bibliometric study was not intended to be a rigorous analysis of the ontology of the
entire discipline of geography or GIScience, only to get a feel for whether masses appear in
geographic inquiry. They do.
Table 3 Phenomena listed in sampled geography, GIScience, and GIS articles.
Objects Masses Field-Masses Plural-Masses Total
Human 50.9% 20.9% 12.4% 15.8% 387
Annals 79 42 15 29 165
IJGIS 38 11 18 9 76
IJRS 5 3 6 2 16
ArcUser 75 25 9 21 130
Environmental 48.2% 26.1% 12.2% 13.5% 245
Annals 60 33 3 23 119
IJGIS 10 5 5 20
IJRS 13 9 11 4 37
ArcUser 35 17 11 6 69
Physical 33.3% 29.9% 29.9% 6.8% 117
Annals 9 1 6 16
IJGIS 8 10 9 27
IJRS 22 19 25 8 74
Total 354 180 113 102 749
47.3% 24.0% 15.1% 13.6%
The listed phenomena are classified in Table 3. At least one mass particular was mentioned
in almost every article, and overall, they were mentioned more often than fields. As one
might expect, masses and fields were more common in physical geography papers than in
human geography (with the latter tending to focus on human-built objects).
Although Mass phenomena were mentioned very frequently, they were never discussed
more than in passing, often immediately being transformed into objects or fields for modeling.
Very few articles reflected on the ontology of their subject matter at all, and of those that did,
none acknowledged masses as an ontic category. For example, one paper discussed at length
the ontology of terrain characteristics (slope, aspect, etc.) as fields, but never mentioned the
ontology of terrain itself.
I also evaluated the mass and field-mass phenomena with regards to the earlier scale
discussion, and encountered geography and GIS projects that were concerned with all of
these scales. There were 73 mentions of micro-scale masses, 63 mini-scale, 18 meso-scale, and
139 macro-scale masses. One would expect micro-scale masses to be very common, simply
because these are the prototypical masses that appear continuous to the naked eye. The large
number of macro-scale masses is largely due to the fact that these are the scales at which
geographic inquiry generally takes place, at which most individual objects are too small to be
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considered separately. I did not fully classify the plural-masses, but in passing they appeared
to be almost exclusively macro-scale. The relatively small number of meso-scale masses is
likely due to a combination of its narrow range of scales, and the fact that these are the
“table-top” scales at which prototypical objects are so prevalent. Also, many of the mass
terms that do occur at these scales, such as silverware, are not very relevant to geography.
So, the fact is that masses of various aggregation scales are already represented in GIS,
without overtly recognizing it. For example:
A polygon layer representing trees (as opposed to digitizing every tree). Yes, the polygon
shape suggests that an object is being represented, but this is an artifice of the vector
data model. The phenomenon is a plural-mass, in which individual trees have been
aggregated and then disregarded, and the polygon is merely a rough attempt to show
where the trees-phenomenon is present. Common attributes of trees-as-mass, such as
Percent Canopy Cover and Species Composition (themselves field-masses), would never
make sense for individual trees.
An isarithmic map of population density. Computing a continuous field of density using
methods such as kernel density estimation is an overt act of aggregating and subverting
individuals into a population mass, of which density is a property.
A sensor network, such as a set of weather stations, which are essentially sample locations
for measuring the characteristics of the air mass. Note that the network does not dictate
a definition of the boundary of the air mass, and we can talk about the measured
characteristics without any regard for such a boundary.
The “mass-ness” of some of these applications is greater than others. It may be that the
mass concept is so embedded in a processing method that users don’t need to know that it is
there.
However, in other situations, a mass ontology could greatly benefit the design and
implementation of data and procedures. For example, an impetus for this research was a
paper submission I reviewed for a journal. The authors had obtained several layers of points
representing different kinds of phenomenon, but they needed raster datasets for their model.
Some of these were distinct objects and should have been rasterized by a mass-aggregation
method such as kernel density estimation, while others were samples of a field, and should
have been rasterized by an interpolation algorithm. However, it appeared that they chose
their rasterization methods for each dataset randomly, and in almost every case, chose the
wrong method. At best, they may have learned some sort of rubric in school to remember
which is which, but forgot. At worst, they didn’t care to learn which is which. Furthermore,
the methods they used to combine and analyze the fields they generated were inappropriate
for their ontological nature, resulting in a “solution” that had no real meaning. In this
situation, a clear understanding of the phenomena their source data represented, and of the
phenomena their model results represented, would have gone a long way toward making
wiser design and analysis decisions, and a more coherent interpretation of the results.
This case is not alone in my experience. I’m not saying that all GIS analysis out there is
being done incorrectly; the published work I collected above did not have glaring ontological
errors, because adept GIScientists and GIS professionals have learned proper practice, even
if they do not consciously think about masses. That said, just as a sound understanding
of the nature of fields leads to better spatial analysis (especially using raster tools), an
understanding of the role of masses in the geographic world and in geographic inquiry will
lead to fewer mistakes of this type.
In a related way, perhaps one reason why masses are not widely recognized in geospatial
theory and practice is because the intuitive pairing between the common dichotomies in
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conceptual and data models (field with raster, object with vector) is so strong, to the
point that exceptions to the correspondence (e.g., vector isolines representing a field) can
cause confusion. I have seen such confusion lead to incorrect analyses, especially among
students. Perhaps altering the ontology and/or conceptual model will break the assumed
correspondence, helping people think more about what they are really trying to represent,
and the data models and analysis tools they use.
Is there a need for new mass-based data models and analysis tools? Probably not. Because
a mass does not have a strong identity like objects do, there is not much need for representing
it as a unified entity. Typically, the study of geographic masses is the study of the geographic
distribution of their attributes, which are nearly always fields. Since models, methods, and
tools for representing and analyzing fields are mature, there is probably little need for more
software.
That is, as long as we use what we have wisely. And being wise requires that you think
about what you’re doing. And part of what you’re doing involves masses.
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